16, there arises a serious problem. There was a time limit for commencing prosecutions of one year from the alleged commission of the offence under section 6 of the SOA 1956, 4 which has been assumed to continue to apply. So it has long been impermissible to charge anyone under section 6 of the SOA 1956, even in serious cases of older men who groomed young girls, and threatened or seduced them into silence for long periods of time.
In the years leading up to the SOA 2003, this unusual time limit proved to be tolerable only because it used to be evaded (!), namely by charging instead indecent assault under section 14 of the SOA 1956, for which the underage girl could also not give effective consent, but for which no time limit was provided in the statute. So 'rough justice' could still be done, and it frequently was. 5 But the House of Lords in J 6 belatedly decided by a 4-1 majority that * I should like to express my thanks to those who commented on an earlier draft of this chapter, including participants at the CLRN Conference in September 2016 and members of 6 KBW Chambers who hosted a presentation later that same month. Special thanks are due to my commentator, Hannah Quirk. 1 SOA 2003, Sch 6, [11] . 2 SOA 2003, s 9 and s 13. 3 The gender-specific limitations follows from the core definition of the offence, under SOA 1956, s 6(1): 'It is an offence, subject to the exceptions mentioned in this section, for a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl not under the age of thirteen but under the age of sixteen.' 4 Section 37(2) gave effect to Sch 2 to the SOA 1956 which concerns modes of prosecution and maximum punishments for various listed offences. Paragraph 10(a) to Sch 2 lists the offence under s 6 and provided: 'a prosecution may not be commenced more than twelve months after the offence charged'. The same limitation applies to attempts to commit the offence.
indecent assault under section 14 of the SOA 1956 could not be charged in cases of underage sexual intercourse 7 so as to avoid the time limit attached to section 6 of the SOA 1956. The statute had to be read as a whole, it was said; and Lord Bingham thought it was impossible to interpret it as though it said that prosecutions for underage sex under section 6 had to commence within one year, but if they were not, they could still be prosecuted under section 14. 8 The need for internal consistency went yet further; other acts which were 'indecent assaults' but were, in truth, preparatory measures towards underage sexual intercourse, were to be regarded as time barred by the decision in J too. 9 So, if 10 the drafters of the SOA 2003
were content to leave alone the time limit attached to section 6 of the SOA 1956 on the basis that charges under section 14 of the SOA 1956 could still be laid, then the decision in J, just a year or so after the SOA 2003 was passed, created a large legal vacuum that no policy maker had anticipated.
We should examine first the reasons for this time limit, which may partly lie in an underestimation of the harms of the offence itself. Then, we shall consider a plausible argument, based on a common law principle of statutory interpretation, that the time limit has already been removed for all proceedings for the offence under section 6 of the SOA 1956
since the SOA 2003 came into force. On the assumption that this interpretation might not be favoured by the courts, we shall then consider a plausible human rights argument which may be raised by determined complainants on suitable facts, which, if successful, would mandate that interpretation. But, we should rather pass legislation which unambiguously allows allegations of underage sexual intercourse committed up until 30 April 2004 still to be prosecuted under section 6 of the SOA 1956. Finally, we discuss why no such reform has already been considered. Some of these reasons might also defeat attempts at legislative reform today.
I The Reasons for the Time Limit
It is hard to state today what good reason there might have been for the time limit attached to section 6 of the SOA 1956. In J, two of their Lordships declined to articulate what policy objective it might have served. 11 Those of their Lordships in J who considered the point accepted that evidential problems many years after the event could not supply a reason for a time limit to be attached to this offence but to no other sexual offence. The most intuitive reason for having a time limit for the particular offence of unlawful sexual intercourse would seem to be to protect younger men from oppressive prosecutions. Lord Rodger imagined the prospects of a young man's consensual dalliances coming back to haunt him many years later, when he might have a family and career. 12 As far as one can tell, this also influenced More likely, the reasons for the time limit in the 1956 Act are rooted further back in history.
Only since 1885 15 has it been an offence for a male to have (possibly consensual) sex with a girl under 16, as opposed to sexual intercourse with a girl under 13. The increase in the age of consent was part of a series of measures aimed primarily against brothels, where many girls between the ages of 13 and 15 were working, rather than flowing from a concern for the wider welfare of young teenage girls in general. Indeed, it was apparently feared that the sort of girl who would agree to sexual intercourse at such a young age was unlikely to be of good character and, if finding herself pregnant, might seek to blame the wealthiest boy of her age known to her. Thus the offence originally carried a time limit of three months, so that any complaint would have to be made before the fact of the girl's pregnancy could be ascertained. 16 This time limit, unsurprisingly, made the law too hard to enforce, 17 and the duration of the limit was steadily raised.
18
When one considers that (male) lawyers and judges were very slow to understand why females of any age might delay reporting sexual offences, and indeed held that all women were unreliable on matters relating to sexual offences, 19 it is unsurprising that girls between 13 to 15 years old who, by their own account, agreed to sex were considered as especially untrustworthy. Little thought seems to have been given to the point that many girls seduced by older men, especially by those in positions of authority over them, 20 would have expected their truthful accounts to be disbelieved, and dismissed as childish fantasies, had they made them while they were still children. Today, happily, we seem better able to understand that children may be much slower than adults to alert the police to serious offences committed against them.
21
Thus, much of the explanation of the time limit lies in a toxic mixture of misogyny, prejudice and ignorance. Yet there was probably more to it. If one assumes that underage sexual intercourse is essentially about illicit love affairs between two young people, then the harms from which the girl is being protected are mainly pregnancy or disease. Nowadays, bearing in mind that many offenders are much older than the underage girl, and might have trapped the girl into a longer term abusive relationship, 22 or might have groomed girls from disadvantaged backgrounds (possibly also making them available to friends) we would describe the potential harms in much wider terms. In the words of Lady Hale, we would expect there to be damage to:
16 See the historical summary in the opinion of Lady Hale in J, (n 6), [74] [75] [76] .
17 Presumably many girls tried to hide the fact of their pregnancy for as long as possible, for many offences were only uncovered when the girl would actually give birth; ibid, [76] . 18 To 6 months by virtue of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1904, s 27. It was raised twice more by measures of 3 months, so that it already stood at 1 year when the offence was consolidated with that same time limit provided for in Sch 2 to the SOA 1956. 19 The requirement for the judge to give a corroboration warning in relation to their accounts was only abolished in England and Wales in Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 32. 20 It may also be assumed that there was less understanding that those inclined towards seducing children may actively seek employment which gives them contact with, or some power over, them.
21 Notably the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority waives its usual time limit of 2 years (from the time of the offence) for all claimants who were under 18 years old at the time of an offence of violence. For them, the 2-year limit runs from the time when they first contacted the police. However, this reading overlooks the important common law distinction between the repeal of substantive law and the repeal of adjectival law. Changes made to substantive law are indeed presumed not to have retrospective effect. 31 But the laws of evidence, or any procedural bars to trial, are only addressed to the court at the time when it tries an offence, and statutory repeals of these laws are presumed to apply in respect of all future court proceedings,
irrespective of the time of the alleged events themselves. Coincidentally, or perhaps not, the leading case on the retrospective extension of a time limit to prosecution concerned the first occasion on which the time limit for underage sexual intercourse was raised from three months to six months. The accused committed the offence when the time limit was only three months but was charged after five months, by which time it had been increased to six months.
He argued, unsuccessfully, that he was protected by the time limit which applied at the time of his offence, but the new time limit was held to have effect, thus enabling the prosecution to proceed. In Chandra Dharma, Lord Alverstone CJ said:
The rule is clearly established that … statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective. It has been held that a statute shortening the time within which proceedings can be taken is retrospective and it seems to me that it is impossible to give any good reason why a statute extending the time within which proceedings may be taken should not also be held to be retrospective … [where statute] only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offences completed before the statute was passed. That is the case here. This statute does not alter the character of the offence, or take away any defence which was formerly open to the prisoner. It is a mere matter of procedure, and according to all the authorities it is therefore retrospective. … the rule at common law is that a statute ought not be given a retrospective operation where to do so would affect an existing right or obligation unless the language of the statute expressly or by necessary implication requires such construction. It is said that statutes dealing with procedure are an exception to the rule and that they should be given a retrospective operation. all, would be the point in leaving on the statute books a time limit to a non-existent offence?).
For, whilst one might readily expect a contrary intention to the rule in Chandra Dharma to be explicitly expressed when a procedural or evidential rule is abolished by itself, maybe less explicitness is required when a procedural rule, attached to a particular offence, is abolished alongside that offence. It might be added that, the whole of Schedule 6 to the SOA 2003 seems to be an indiscriminate tidying-up exercise in removing both old offences and anything 34 Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515, 518.
to do with those repealed offences; and that reading the whole package together might draw one to the conclusion that they were all meant to be abolished to the same extent. positive obligation arises on such facts might give us confidence that at least Article 8 would be held properly to be engaged on the very similar facts as suggested above.
The second element, whether the time limit does create a substantial barrier to justice, seems relatively easily satisfied, as the law is presently understood. It might, however, be necessary for the evidence of the alleged abuse to be prima facie sufficiently plausible that the allegation might otherwise have been prosecuted, else the time bar might not be thought to be such an 'effective' barrier in the applicant's case. It might also be important that the defendant is not also charged with even more serious offences (such as rape) against the same complainant. If he does face such other charges, it might then be thought that the complainant could still have 'effective' justice through prosecution for the alleged rape, especially since evidence of the underage seduction would likely be regarded as background evidence to the alleged rape and to some extent a conviction of rape might be seen as recognition of the fact of the other abuse too. This would not be 'perfect' justice, but a distinction may be thought to exist between 'perfect' justice and the 'effective' justice which Member States are required to seek by virtue of the doctrine of positive obligations.
The third element, whether the State might justify the time limit, is perhaps the simplest. We should not worry that time limits for offences may be relatively common on the continent. It is more to the point that time limits for indictable offences in England are not part of our culture, that this one is exceptional, and that it seems especially inapt for this offence to have been almost singled out in this way. Besides, by this stage of the analysis the applicant may also claim a violation of Article 8 alongside Article 14 of the ECHR (prohibition on discrimination). Article 14 provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language …. When we consider the plausibility of the argument that the time limit has already been removed, either by ordinary canons of interpretation or by invoking the Human Rights Act 1998, it may seem odd that no case has yet been brought. In theory at least, domestic law does permit a complainant to challenge the time limit. On being told by the CPS that 'her'
case cannot be prosecuted under either section 6 or section 14 of the SOA 1956, she could first challenge the decision under the Victims' Right to Review, and outline the legal arguments that may be made against the application of the time limit. If unsuccessful, she might seek judicial review of that decision on the basis that it is legally flawed because the time limit does not apply.
But such an applicant must move quickly to meet the three-month time limit for commencing judicial review. 50 Many victims take years to summon up the courage to revisit this aspect of their past, and are quite knocked back to square one when belatedly told of a hitherto unmentioned legal obstacle. Three months may quickly pass in such circumstances. Further, if she wishes to avail herself of the human rights argument (and she might be advised that this would be her best chance of success) then the particular alleged facts of her case would become important. On the above account, she might need to be alleging underage sexual intercourse with some element of grooming or manipulation, and the encounters might need to have persisted with sufficient regularity and long lasting effects for it to be accepted that Article 8 is engaged. It might also be necessary that she was 13 years old at the time of the offence, as opposed to 15 years old, at the time, and that underage sexual intercourse would have been by far the most appropriate charge that could properly be brought. Finally, there may need to be some prima facie plausibility to the allegation, such that one might expect the case 'otherwise' to be prosecuted.
In other words, even using human rights law has its limitations as a means of procuring reform by judicial means. It may be in fact for the better that no complainant has yet put the matter to the legal test, if otherwise a test case did not disclose an ideal set of facts as set out above, and then failed accordingly. Presumably, neither the CPS nor the Secretary of State for Justice would much relish spending thousands of pounds on legal fees to defend the application of such an anachronistic time limit, but they would be expected to take the legal points available to them; and were a case to be successfully defended, it might then be harder to gather momentum for reforming a time limit which had seemingly been tested and declared compatible with human rights law. From that perspective, everyone should prefer legislative reform instead.
III The Case for Legislative Reform
Legislative reform could be effectuated in one provision. For example, it might be provided that 'proceedings for the offence under section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956
("intercourse with a girl between thirteen and sixteen") shall not be barred only by virtue of the passage of time.' 51 Such a provision could be included in legislation on a miscellany of other criminal justice matters. There should be no difficulty in the relevant Secretary of State declaring that he or she believes the provision to be compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. As it is a purely procedural matter, there is nothing in principle to suggest that such reform would violate any rights of prospective defendants. Compliance with Article 7 of the ECHR would only require that trial judges apply the substantive law as it was at the time and observe maximum sentence of two-year imprisonment when sentencing convicted defendants; and in the latter respect, defendants charged and convicted under section 6 of the SOA 1956 would still be considerably better off than they would have been if it were possible to charge them under the modern section 9 of the SOA 2003.
Further consequential rules could be enacted if thought appropriate, but from the legal perspective, none seems to be essential. The CPS would apply its own contemporary public interest test to the alleged facts of each case, which ought to rule out most proceedings where there was no grooming or exploitation of the girl. 52 If necessary, however, it could be provided that prosecutions enabled by the new provision should require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, a device which pre-empts private prosecutions from being instituted and which often seems to reassure Parliamentarians. At common law, prosecutors would probably not be held to any earlier assurances of non-prosecution which had been made on account of the time limit, and indeed any confessions made to the offence on that basis should be admissible. 53 There might be more disquiet over prosecuting offenders who have already been sentenced to prison (and since released) for other sexual activities with the same girl. But even here, no fault for the problem would normally be attributable to the prosecutor or police, 54 and it might be thought that, if it were decided that a prosecution for underage sexual intercourse might still be in the public interest, such cases could ultimately be dealt with fairly at sentencing. 55 At any rate, it is not obvious that any extra statutory provisions are needed to address these broadly familiar problems in criminal procedure.
There are several reasons to think that such a proposal, if properly understood, would be of interest to many MPs. There is today a wider acceptance that many complainants giving 'where a defendant, for example, is exploitative, or coercive, or much older than the victim, the balance may be in favour of prosecution, whereas if the sexual activity is truly of the victim's own free will the balance may not be in the public interest to prosecute. … In addition, it is not in the public interest to prosecute children who are of the same or similar age and understanding that engage in sexual activity, where the activity is truly consensual for both parties and there are no aggravating features, such as coercion or corruption …'. 53 In Dunlop [2006] EWCA Crim 1354 the Court of Appeal held that it was fair to admit at retrial a person's confession to a murder of which he had already been acquitted, which he had made at an earlier time when it
was not yet possible for him to be retried. 54 In Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254, it was held not to be an abuse of process to lay a belated charge arising out of the same facts from a previous trial if at the time of the first trial it was thought that the law did not permit that additional charge to be laid. 55 Courts need only 'take account' of current sentencing guidelines in relation to offences committed before 6 April 2010.
be heard. 56 It is relevant too that, following various well publicised scandals including the prolonged sexual abuse of young teenage girls in Rotherham, 57 the political community is likely to regard grooming of young girls for sex as to be treated with comparable seriousness as rape. Indeed, it is very easy for non-lawyers to think that underage sexual intercourse following grooming is 'non-consensual' and must therefore constitute the offence of rape itself. By analogy, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) has long been prepared to accept underage sexual intercourse following grooming as a 'crime of violence', on the questionable basis that there was no 'factual consent' from the girl.
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Caution is needed at this point; for although it is important that the gravity of many such offences is recognized, campaigners should be careful to explain that in law, there is a difference between rape and underage sexual intercourse.. Both before and after the SOA 2003, an underage girl between 13 and 15 years old who agrees to sex, understanding its mechanics and feeling that she is free to make up her own mind whether to agree, gives valid consent to defeat a rape charge, just as any adult woman would. 59 The fact that many underage girls who are victims of sophisticated grooming techniques might be in denial about their own exploitation, and might wrongly consider that they take such decisions in their own interests, is precisely why offences relating to underage sexual intercourse have existed independently. 60 It is as well to explain that these cases cannot necessarily be prosecuted as rape, in order to emphasise the impact of the time limit problem. Finally, it might be urged that these cases are not necessarily of 'historic' importance only. Recalling the long delay in complaining that may be associated with reporting this offence, 61 it is surely just as likely that 56 Theresa May, when she was Home Secretary, said 'Perpetrators must never be allowed to think that their horrific acts will go overlooked or go unpunished … Victims and survivors … deserve to be heard now, just as they should have been years ago, and they deserve justice, just as they did then': S Laville, 'Police expect 30,000 new child abuse reports from Goddard inquiry' Guardian Online (19 May 2016). we need to prosecute some predatory offenders who have continued offending since 2004 but against whom only a victim from before 1 May 2004 is now ready to testify.
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One might imagine some disquiet from those who worry in general terms about fair trials for sexual offences after so many years. 63 But they would surely accept too that there is neither rhyme nor reason in leaving underage sexual intercourse as the one sexual offence which cannot be prosecuted today, and would have to concede that the current time limit is discriminatory against girls, as noted in Part II, and as such is indefensible.
So why have there been no MPs calling for such a simple reform? The most likely answer, to the author's mind, is that no one has alerted any MP to the problem; at any rate, the author knows of nothing which suggests otherwise. Today, it is the media and special interest groups who play the biggest role in alerting MPs to possible causes of law reform. But the problem is very hard to explain briefly and precisely, and even intelligent and earnest journalists have struggled to run an accessible story on it. The author has some experience here, having been contacted by Radio 4 64 and by a journalist for a national newspaper in consequence of a short article 65 that he once wrote on the subject. First, one explains that the problem 'only' arises in cases involving conduct up until 30 April 2004, and that it 'only' affects underage sexual intercourse with girls (why, they ask?). Usually it is necessary to explain the difference between rape and underage sexual intercourse (a matter which many find difficult, as alluded to above). It is then necessary to explain why it is only recently that the time limit is such a problem, ie, because before J it used to be thought acceptable to charge under section 14 of the SOA 1956 instead (why did the House of Lords suddenly decide otherwise, some might interject?). When one is asked why the time limit was not abolished altogether in SOA 2003, the answer, as related in Part II, is that it quite possibly was; but, the CPS has not properly argued the point-for reasons unknown (anticipating thereby other questions 66 ). For those who want to write short, but also accurate, summaries of the law for lay readers, the 'accessibility problem' that arises from these qualifications and uncertainties is considerable.
The author is not aware of any mainstream newspaper which has as much as adverted to the problem, while countless newspaper articles have featured discussions of historic sex cases in clear ignorance of it.
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But there are two further reasons why interest from the media has been muted; and these bring us to our final section.
IV Two Obstacles to Media Interest
In explaining the lack of media interest, there is more than the accessibility problem in play.
Just as one photograph might be thought to be worth one thousand words of text, a single statistic proclaiming a high figure of prosecutions that would have been brought, but for the time limit, would likely substitute for a detailed explanation of the legal obstacle. But this brings us to our first obstacle in this Part: it is very hard to estimate how many prosecutions have been disabled by the time limit, let alone to guess how many might now be enabled by abolishing it. Alternatively, a quote from the CPS bemoaning the time limit, or at least acknowledging that the problem may merit some attention, might serve to give the story some perceived media impact. But (the second obstacle), the CPS has shown apparent indifference to it. These problems merit special attention, not least because of their potential role in obstructing other valuable reforms.
A Difficulties in Estimating the Number of Affected Cases
The would-be reformer should expect to be asked how many allegations of underage sexual The journalist did not make a separate FOI request to the CPS. But there is little reason to think that the CPS would be able to assist more than the police on the matter of estimating numbers of affected cases. Whereas the police would at least record the alleged offence under the relevant code, time limit or not, the trail at the CPS, should the time problem be spotted, is apt to run off into a number of different directions. A range of alternative charges might conceivably have been brought by a prosecutor frustrated by the time limit. Thus, whenever a charge of rape against an underage girl has been preferred in relation to an incident before 1 76 It is on account of this uninspiring pattern that when some police forces purport to have records of offenders being tried and even convicted out of time (as the law is currently understood), one wonders whether some of these records may indeed be right. It is true that the decision in J is noted on the CPS website, 77 but only the bare reference is given, and with little indication of its importance. It is easy to imagine that some busy prosecutors who are not already au fait with the problem might overlook it when affected cases happen to come their way, 78 especially since more of their caseload falls under the SOA 2003 where there are no time limits of which to be wary. We might note that the Court of Appeal has itself complained that the analogous time limit for historic cases of gross indecency between men has been overlooked on several occasions. 79 The picture which then emerges is one of a lottery where sometimes offenders are wrongly prosecuted despite the time limit, but no one knows how often it has happened. But journalists (and perhaps MPs) who may seek views or insight relating to the time limit are likely to turn to the CPS, and it is a significant frustration that the latter might be unable to provide much of either. Some criticism must be made of apparent indifference here. Even if it is too much to expect the CPS to compile statistics, it could at least form an impression of the problem and its working implications by surveying police investigators, its case workers, and trial lawyers.
Thus, specialist police officers who interview complainants could usefully be asked whether they feel obliged, perhaps awkwardly, to ask whether any separate (ie non-time barred) indecent activity also took place and then to focus their questioning on any such incidents, albeit no doubt to the consternation of the complainant. CPS case workers could be asked how often they have considered alternative charges on account of the time bar, and whether they have seemed appropriate to reflect the apparent level of offending. Trial prosecutors might be asked for their impressions of such cases, where the jury hears of the sexual intercourse and yet is not asked to consider any count relating to it. It is surely possible that some juries wrongly speculate that the CPS itself does not believe the complainant on the matter of the sexual intercourse, thus causing them wrongly to doubt the complainant evidence about other allegations. Ideally, affected past complainants should also be consulted. It would be invaluable to know whether they feel that their cases are ineffectively prosecuted on account of the time limit. One imagines that many might feel this way, even if other indecent activities, which they may remember less well, were prosecuted instead of the vaginal sexual intercourse. For many, the vaginal intercourse may well be the most regretted incident of all (eg if it necessitated an abortion). This author recently put this point to a former Crown prosecutor who was used to applying the time limit and charging other offences instead. Did complainants have a problem with this? 'I wouldn't know', came back the answer, and then, after a moment's thought, 'but quite possibly so'.
Some senior prosecutors have said to this author that they had not even heard of the time limit, as though to suggest that, if it is a problem, indeed it cannot be a serious one. But the fact that they have not heard of the time limit is as much a symptom of the problems within the CPS as a possible indication of their absence. It is impossible, to the author's mind, to credit such bland assurances when not even the most basic research seems to have been carried out within the CPS. But journalists and MPs may yet be inclined to give them credit. courts. An unambiguous legislative reform would be better.
V Conclusion
So far, however, the indications are that starting a campaign for reform through the media is difficult. The difficulties should cause us to reflect that the police and CPS are predominantly concerned with law enforcement and not with law reform. It should not surprise us if they record offences and decisions in ways which assist them but might quite frustrate researchers who expect to find reasonably reliable statistics. The reform as proposed here would have had a better audience had the media been apprised of it shortly after the decision in J: for the media might then have been interested to run a story about its very potential to ruin a high number of very serious cases, and the CPS might then have obliged with a warning about the potential problems. But over ten years later, the evidence of the number of cases affected is missing and the CPS has altogether lost sight of the matter.
Admittedly, by no means all avenues of reform have been exhausted. The determined complainant with a suitable case might yet start judicial review of a decision not to prosecute on account of the time limit; or, perhaps the author, or an influential reader of this article, will prove able to bring the problem to the attention of appropriate MPs or the Ministry of Justice.
Even now, it need not be too late for reform.
